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Abstract. While online communities have become increasingly impor-
tant over the years, the moderation of user-generated content is still
performed mostly manually. Automating this task is an important step
in reducing the financial cost associated with moderation, but the major-
ity of automated approaches strictly based on message content are highly
vulnerable to intentional obfuscation. In this paper, we discuss methods
for extracting conversational networks based on raw multi-participant
chat logs, and we study the contribution of graph features to a classi-
fication system that aims to determine if a given message is abusive.
The conversational graph-based system yields unexpectedly high per-
formance, with results comparable to those previously obtained with a
content-based approach.
Keywords: Text categorization, Abuse detection, Online communities,
moderation
1 Introduction
The widespread availability of Internet access allows users from around the world
to congregate into online communities. With the ever-increasing number of users,
online communities have become important places to trade ideas, and have ac-
quired a great socio-economical importance.
However, because of the anonymity provided by the medium, an online com-
munity is often confronted with users that display abusive behaviors. For com-
munity maintainers, it can be important to act on this issue through the use
of moderation, because failure to do so can poison the community, trigger user
exodus, and expose the administrators to legal jeopardy. Moderation is the ap-
plication of sanctions when users are judged to violate the community rules.
When done by humans, this work is expensive and companies have a vested
interest in automating the process. One can distinguish two types of automated
systems assisting in moderation: 1) an automated flagging system that raises
some messages to the attention of moderators; and 2) a fully automated system
that detects abusive messages and executes sanctions on users that are breaking
the community rules.
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In this work, we consider the classification problem of automatically deter-
mining if a message from a user is abusive or not. For this purpose, we propose
an original approach aiming at exploring a range of graph-based features ex-
tracted from online textual conversations. We first extract various types of con-
versational networks, i.e. graphs where vertices represent users and where edges
correspond to supposed message-based interactions between them. We then pro-
cess a number of graph-theoretical measures that characterize these networks
in different ways. A classifier is then trained and tested on a corpus of chat
logs originating from the community of the French massively multiplayer on-line
game SpaceOrigin1. We finally conduct a qualitative study to analyze the im-
pact of each graph-based feature on the automatic abusive message classification
performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review re-
lated work on abuse detection and network extraction from raw conversation
logs. In Section 3, we describe the method proposed to extract conversational
networks, and the topological features that we compute for the resulting graphs.
In Section 4, our dataset is presented as well as the overall experimental setup
for the classification task. A discussion and a qualitative study of our results is
also provided. Finally, we summarize our contributions in Section 5 and present
some perspectives.
2 Related Work
This section is a brief review of the literature focusing on the most relevant works
relating to two aspects of the problem at hand. First, in Subsection 2.1, we review
general works regarding the detection of online abuse. Second, in Subsection 2.2,
we explore previously used techniques to extract network structures from raw
conversation data.
2.1 Abuse Detection
One can distinguish two main categories of works related to abuse detection:
those using the content of the exchanged messages and those focusing on their
context. Some works also propose to combine both categories.
From the content-based point-of-view, the work initiated by Spertus in [19]
was a first attempt to create a classifier for hostile messages. This is relevant
to us, because abusive messages often contain hostility. They use static rules
to extract linguistic markers for each message: Imperative Statement, Profanity,
Condescension, Insult, Politeness and Praise. These are then used as features in
a binary classifier. They obtain good results, except in specific cases like hostility
through sarcasm. However, the limitation of this approach is that its application
to another language is a difficult task, requiring to transpose it to other grammar
rules and idioms.
1 https://play.spaceorigin.fr/
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Cheng et al. [5] note that a word tagged as offensive in a message is not a
definite indication that the message is offensive, i.e. while ”You are stupid.” is
clearly offensive, ”This is stupid. xD” is not. Lack of context can be somewhat
mitigated by looking at word n-grams instead of unigrams (i.e. single words).
Dinakar et al. [8] use tf -idf features, a static list of badwords and of widely
used sentences containing verbal abuse to detect cyberbullying in Youtube com-
ments. Again, their model showed good results, except when sarcasm was used.
In [4], Chavan et al. review machine learning approaches to detect aggressive
messages in on-line social networks. They show that Pronoun Occurrence, usually
neglected in text classification, is important, and use Skip-Gram features to
mitigate the context issues.
Content-based text classification usually makes for a good baseline. Content
features are inexpensive to compute. However, such methods have severe limi-
tations: for instance, abuse can be spread over a succession of messages. Some
messages can reference a shared history between two users. Even more com-
mon are users that are voluntarily obfuscating message content to work around
badwords detection. Indeed, abusers can bypass automatic systems by making
the abusive content difficult to detect [11]: for instance, they can intentionally
modify the spelling of a forbidden word.
Because the reactions of other users to an abuse case are completely beyond
the control of the abuser, some works consider the content of messages around
the targeted message.
For instance, Yin et al. [21] use features derived from the neighboring phrases
of a given message to detect harassment on the Web. Their goal is to spot
conversations going off-topic, and use that as an indicator. Their approach shows
good results when used against multi-participant chat logs, and they note that
sentiment features seem to constitute mostly noise due to the high misspelling
rate.
In [6], Cheng et al. propose to focus on building user behavior models. For
this purpose, they perform a comprehensive study of antisocial behavior in on-
line discussion communities. Their work provides insight into the devolution of
abusive users over time in a community, regarding both the quality of their
contributions and their reactions towards other members of the community. A
critical result of the analysis is that instances of antisocial messages usually
generate a bigger response from the community, compared to normal messages.
Balci et al. [1] make use of user features to detect abuse in the community of
an online game. These features include information such as gender, number of
friends, financial investment, avatars, and general rankings. The goal is to help
human moderators dealing with abuse reports, and the approach yields suffi-
ciently good results to achieve it. However, in our case the user data necessary
to replicate this approach is not available.
In our own previous work [15], we propose to detect abusive messages from
chat messages using a wide array of language features (bag-of-words, tf -idf
scores, sentiment scores, etc.) as well as context features derived from the lan-
guage models of other users. We also try advanced preprocessing approaches.
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This method allowed us to reach a performance of 72.1% in terms of F -measure
on an abusive message detection task.
2.2 Network Extraction from Raw Data
Although a major part of the solutions focus on content features of exchanged
messages to address the abuse problem, it appears that a user with previous
exposure to automatic moderation techniques can easily circumvent them [11].
To avoid this problem, a solution would be to not focus only on the direct content
exchanged but on the interactions between the users through these messages.
The number of respondents to a given message appears frequently in the
literature, as a classification feature, e.g. [6]. However, there are not many works
dealing with the extraction of conversational networks. This may be due to
the fact that the task can be far from trivial, depending on the nature of the
available raw data: the task is much harder for chat logs than for structured
messages board or Web forums, for instance. These networks have the advantage
of including the mentioned feature, but also much more information regarding
the way users interact.
In [13], Mutton proposes a strategy to extract such a network from IRC chat
logs. The goal is to build a tool to visualize user interactions in an IRC chat
room over time. The author uses a simple set of rules based on direct referencing
(when a user addresses another one by using his nickname), temporal proximity
of messages, and temporal density of messages. In this paper, we will adapt and
expend on those rules. Specifically, while in a regular IRC channel timestamps
are indeed useful to determine intended recipients of a message, in our case they
are basically irrelevant, so this approach cannot be adapted as is.
Travassoli et al. [20] explore different methods to extract representative net-
works from group psychotherapy chat logs. One method includes fuzzy refer-
encing to mitigate effects of misspelled nicknames, and rules for representing
one-to-all messages. The bulk of the methods uses static patterns of exchanges
to predict a receiver. Their system shows a good agreement score with a human
annotator.
Sinha et al. [18] use only direct referencing, but with the same fuzzy matching
strategy, in order to extract a network representing the activity in the #ubuntu
IRC support channel. This method manages to expose high level components
of the Ubuntu social network, which in turn allows for the qualification of user
behaviors into specific classes. This method of building user models can be very
interesting when the data describing the users are scarce, as is the case on IRC
where everyone can join and there is no requirement to register.
3 Methods
In this section, we describe our proposed original approach to detect abusive
messages. It basically consists in training a classifier on features corresponding
to topological measures processed on conversational networks. The classifier is
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standard, so we focus on the processing of the features. Thereby, Subsection 3.1
presents how we extract conversational networks from conversation logs, while
Subsection 3.2 describes the topological measures computed for these conversa-
tional networks, and later used as classification features.
3.1 Network Extraction
We extract networks representing conversations between users, through a textual
discussion channel. They take the form of weighted undirected graphs, in which
the vertices and edges represent the users and the communication between them,
respectively. The edge weights are a score which is an estimation of the intensity
of the communication between the two connected users. Note that each network
is defined relatively to a targeted message, since the goal of this operation is to
provide features used to classify the said message.
The first step consists in determining which messages are used to extract the
network. For this purpose, we define a context period, which is centered on the
targeted message, and spans symmetrically before and after its occurrence. We
arbitrarily use a width of 200 messages in our experiments. The graph extracted
from this context period contains only the vertices representing the users which
posted at least once on this channel, during this period.
The second step is to add the appropriate edges to the network, and to
process their weight. We use a method based on a sliding window, a choice that
is justified by two properties of the user interface of the considered discussion
channel: 1) when a user joins a channel, the server sends him only the last 20
messages posted on the channel; and 2) it is impossible for a user to scroll back
the history further than 20 lines. In our experiments, we arbitrarily use a window
of 10 messages. We apply an iterative process, consisting in sliding the window
over the whole context one message at a time. We call current message the
last message of the window taken at a given time. Our assumption is that this
message is destined to the authors of the other messages present in the window
at this time. Furthermore, we suppose it is more likely that the message concerns
the users who posted the most recently. These hypotheses can be justified by
another property of the user interface: by default, users do not know who is in
the channel at a given time, in particular the join / part events are not shown
to them.
Based on these hypotheses, we update the edges and weights in the following
way. First, we list the authors of the messages currently present in the window,
order them by last message posted, and discard the author of the current message
(since it is possible that several of his messages appear in this window): this
results in what we call the neighbor list. However, the user interface allows to
explicitly mention users in a message by their name, and the game prevents the
users from changing their name: we need to take this property into account. For
this purpose, we move the users directly referenced in the current message at
the top of our list. If a user was not even in the window, it is simply inserted at
the top of the list. Each user in the neighbor list is assigned by a score, which
is a decreasing function of both his position in the list and of the length of the
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neighbor list. We can then update the graph: we create an edge between each
user in the neighbor list and the author of the current message, with a weight
corresponding to the user’s score. If this edge already exists, we increase its
current weight by the user’s score.
Our choice to create or update edges towards all users in the window even
in case of direct referencing is based on several considerations. First, directly
referencing a user does not imply that he is part of the conversation or that the
message is directed towards him: for instance, his name could just be mentioned
as an object of the sentence. Second, there can be multiple direct references
in a single message. Third, when in online public discourse, directly addressing
someone does not mean he is the sole intended recipient of the message. For
instance when discussing politics, a question directed towards someone can have
as a secondary objective to have the target expose his stance on an issue to the
other participants.
Once the iterative process has been applied for the whole context period, we
get what we call the Full network. For testing matters, we also process 2 lesser
networks based on the same context: the Before and After networks are extracted
using only the 100 messages preceding and following the targeted message, re-
spectively, as well as the targeted message itself. Figure 1 shows an example of
the three networks associated with an abusive comment.
Fig. 1. Example of the 3 types of conversational networks extracted for a given context
period: Before (left), After (center), and Full (right). The abusive user is represented
in red.
3.2 Features
The classification features we consider in this work are all topological mea-
sures, allowing to characterize graphs in various ways. We adopt an exploratory
approach and consider a wide range of such measures, focusing on the most
widespread in the literature. In the following, we describe them briefly, distin-
guishing between local ones, which characterize individual vertices, and global
ones, which describe the whole graph at once. We process all the features for
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each of the 3 types of networks (Before, After, Full) described in the previous
subsection.
Local Topological Measures. These measures are computed for the Vertex
corresponding to the author of the targeted message.
The Degree centrality is a normalized version of the standard degree, which
corresponds itself to the number of direct neighbors of the considered vertex. The
Eigenvector Centrality [2] can be considered as a generalization of the degree, in
which instead of just counting the neighbors, one also takes into account their
centrality: a central neighbor increases the centrality of the vertex of interest
more than a peripheral one.
The PageRank Centrality [3] is also spectral (like the Eigenvector Centrality),
but it is based on very different rationales. It models a random walk occurring
on the network, and noticeably includes the possibility for the walker to teleport
anywhere in the network at any step. The Hub and Authority Scores [12] are
two complementary measures also based on random walks.
The Betweenness Centrality [9] is based on the number of shortest paths
going through the considered vertex.
In communication networks, it is sometimes interpreted as the level of control
the vertex of interest has over information transmission in the network. The
Closeness Centrality [9] is the reciprocal of the total geodesic distance (i.e. the
length of the shortest path) between the vertex of interest and the other vertices.
It is generally considered it measures the efficiency of the vertex to spread a
message over the graph, and its independence from the other vertices in terms of
communication. The Eccentricity [10] is also distance-based, but to the contrary
of the other selected measures, it quantifies how peripheral the vertex of interest
is, by considering the distance to its farthest vertex.
Finally, the Coreness Score [17] is based on the notion of k-core, which is a
maximal induced subgraph whose all vertices have a degree of at least k. The
coreness of a vertex is the k of the k-core of maximal degree to which it belongs.
Global Topological Measures. First, we use very classic statistics describing
the graph size, the Vertex and Edge Counts. We also select the Density, which
corresponds to the ratio of the number of existing edges to the number of edges
in a complete graph containing the same number of vertices. In other words,
the density corresponds to the proportion of existing edges, compared to the
maximal possible number for the considered graph.
We also use two distance-related measures. The first is the Diameter, which
corresponds to the highest distance found in the graph, i.e. the length of the
longest shortest path. The second is the Average Distance, which is the average
length of the shortest path processed over all pairs of vertices.
We process the total Clique Count in the network, where a clique is a com-
plete induced subgraph. The Degree Assortativity [14] is also potentially inter-
esting. It corresponds to the correlation processed between the series constituted
of all connected vertices, and measures the statistical dependence between the
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degrees of two vertices and the presence of an edge connecting them. Finally, for
each one of the 10 previously described local measures, we process the average
over the whole graph.
4 Experiments
In this section, we first briefly present our corpus and our experimental setup
(Subsection 4.1), before describing and discussing our classification results (Sub-
section 4.2).
4.1 Experimental Setup
We have access to a database of 4, 029, 343 messages that were exchanged by
the users of a browser-based multi-player game. In the database, 779 messages
have been flagged by one or more users as being abusive and subsequently con-
firmed as abusive by the game moderators. Each message belongs to a unique
communication channel.
We further extract 2, 000 messages at random from the messages not con-
firmed as abusive to constitute the non-abuse class. We previously experimented
with this dataset in [15].
Because of the relatively small dataset, our experiment is set up for 10-Fold
cross validation. We use a 70%-train / 30%-test split.
We use Python-iGraph [7] to create the network and process the graph-based
features for each message. As a classifier, we use an SVM, implemented in Sklearn
under the name SVC (C-Support Vector Classification) [16] toolkit.
4.2 Results
Table 1 displays the results obtained for our random baseline, the content- and
context-based classifier we previously presented in [15], and the graph-based
classifier proposed in this article. The baseline uses the same classifier and ar-
chitecture but the feature extraction step is replaced by a dummy function that
yields two random values in [0, 1]. Our previous approach takes advantage of mor-
phological, language and user behavior-based features, such as: message length,
number of words, compressibility, bag of words with tf–idf scores and probabil-
ity of n-gram emission. In the present experiment, the training and testing sets
were resampled, which explains why the values displayed for the content/context-
based classifier are slightly different form the ones shown in [15].
With the graph-based approach, the performance is improved according to all
3 considered measures, compared to our previous effort. The overall performance
is unexpectedly high for an approach that completely ignores the content of the
messages. We suppose that this is mainly due to the fact that two thirds of the
features include information regarding to the part of the conversations happening
after the classified message, whereas this was the case for only two features (out
of 67) in our content/context-based approach. Independently from this point,
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the fact that both approaches reach relatively high performance levels is a very
promising result: given that both classifiers are built on completely different
features, combining them should even improve the overall performance.
Table 1. Classification results (in %) of the 3 abusive message classifiers: a random
baseline, our previous approach [15], and the one presented in this article. All measures
are computed for the Abuse class.
Experiment Precision Recall F -Measure
Random baseline 29.3 52.6 37.6
Content/context-based classifier 70.3 74.3 72.2
Graph-based classifier 76.8 77.2 77.0
Since our classifier is an SVM, we can use the Platt Scalling implementation
of Sklearn to vary the decision threshold and therefore tune the system towards
either high precision or high recall. The left plot of Figure 2 shows the Precision-
Recall curves of each of the 10 classifiers created for our experiment. One can
see that by lowering the post probability threshold a little, it is possible to gain
better coverage of the abuse class without losing too much precision. Therefore,
we would argue that this system shows better promise as an alert system than
as an automated moderation system.
Fig. 2. Left: Precision-Recall curves of the 10 SVM classifiers. Right: Feature ablation
curves of one classifier (200 runs). In both plots, the red curve represents the average.
In order to estimate the importance of our features with regards to this
classification task, we use the meta estimator ExtraTreesClassifier provided by
the Sklearn toolkit. While the process is stochastic, it allows to give features a
score indicating their contribution to the decisions of the classifier. We run fur-
ther ablation runs, ordering the features by increasing impact of their removal
on the classifier performance. This allows obtaining a smoother curve, with a
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performance drop on the right-side, corresponding to the removal of the most
discriminant features (right plot of Figure 2). Table 2 shows the 10 most dis-
criminant features: using only these features, one can train a classifier obtaining
a F -Measure score of 75.8%.
Table 2. Most useful features of the graph-based classification approach.
Network Feature name F -Measure before ablation
Full Average Betweenness Centrality 75.8
Before Average Coreness Score 75.4
After Edge Count 74.5
After Density 73.1
Full Hub Score 72.9
After Degree Centrality 67.7
Before Edge Count 67.2
Full Average Eccentricity 58.4
Before Average Eigenvector Centrality 56.6
Full Eccentricity 35.0
Overall, these features are quite heterogeneous, topologically speaking, in the
sense they correspond to very different ways of characterizing graph structures.
The Degree Centrality, Edge Count, and Density features are based on a mi-
croscopic view of the graph (vertices and edges are considered individually, or
only with respect to their direct neighborhood). On the contrary, the Between-
ness Centrality, Hub Score and Eccentricity are macroscopic, because they take
advantage of paths spanning the whole graph. Finally, the Coreness Score is
mesoscopic, in the sense it is based on an intermediate view and considers sub-
graphs. This is consistent with the assumption that redundant features should
not appear amongst the most discriminant ones.
At first sight, finding both Edge Count and Density can be surprising: given
that the latter is a normalized version of the former, one could suppose they are
redundant. However, this normalization is based on the number of vertices in the
graph. Thus, in the present case, this simply means that the number of edges in
our networks does not increase as a square function of number of vertices. On the
contrary, certain features present in the table are part of some very correlated
groups of features, which can be considered as almost inter-exchangeable. For
instance, the Average Eigenvector Centrality and Average Hub Score for the
Before graph have a 0.73 correlation.
All 3 considered types of graphs (Before, After, Full) are represented in these
top features, which means they convey different information and are all of some
help regarding the classification problem at hand. Moreover, it appears that
certain related features appear together for several versions of the graph. This
is the case for the Edge Count (Before vs. After), and of the Hub Score and
Eigenvector Centrality (Full vs. Before). We assume that this reflects the fact
abuses significantly modify the graph structure, according to these topological
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measures. In other words, they reflect strong changes in the conversation dy-
namics. When a measure appears only for the Before or After version of the
graph, we conclude it allows characterizing only the pre- or post-state of the
conversation, relatively to the abuse.
It is interesting that both the individual and average Eccentricity features are
present in this table. A closer look reveals that their values are lower for graphs
belonging to the Abuse class. This means that the maximal distance between
the author of the targeted message and the rest of the graph decreases in case of
abuse. More concretely, this user becomes less peripheral (or more central), and
the same goes for the other users of the graph (in average). This fits in quite well
with assumptions about how abuse impacts a discussion: an abuser would tend
not to be peripheral in a conversation, while we can reasonably assume that the
other participants will be piling on and therefore be less peripheral themselves.
This may also explain why those features are, by far, the most discriminant ones.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have presented an approach purely based on graph features to
tackle the problem of automatically detecting online abuse. The method, while
simple, yields reasonable results, besting the score obtained with our previous
effort, which was content- and context-based.
However it is important to note a couple of important limitations. First, the
amount of necessary computation is quite high if it is to be applied each time
a new message is posted to the channel, compared to a pure content-based ap-
proach. Second, the method can only be applied after a delay when the necessary
number of messages have been posted in response to the target message - this
is not a method that can help prevent the 5th message in a torrent of insults
from reaching the channel. Rather, it could be used to perform some a posteriori
moderation.
The next step in our study will be to assess the impact of different network
construction strategies on the performance of the classifier. This will include ex-
perimenting with other weight distribution strategies, and different sizes for the
context period and the sliding window. We will then aim to combine this system
with our content-based classifier: in theory, they are both based on completely
different types of information, so we can assume they are complementary and
could lead to improved classification performance.
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